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FORUM

tice Powell distinguished Trimble and Lalli by declaring
that whereas the statute in the former case involved the
burdensome requirement of marriage, thus making the
reach of the Illinois law "far in excess of its justifiable purposes," (99 S.Ct. at 527), the latter statute involved
simply an evidentiary requirement. In admitting that
some illegitimate children would be hurt by the statute,
the Court remarked that "few statutory classifications
are entirely free from the criticism that they sometimes
produce inequitable results." 99 S.Ct. at 526.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute
requiring that a judicial decree be issued during the lifetime of the father before an illegitimate child can assert a
claim against his intestate father's estate. In sum, §4-1.2
is substantially related to the primary state interests
involved. While Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Mr. Justice
Blackmun concurred in the judgment, Justice
Blackmun's opinion advocated the overruling of
Trimble.
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice White,
Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Stevens joined, filed
a dissenting opinion. Practically speaking, Justice Brennan argued, illegitimate children who are presently acknowledged and supported by their fathers are not likely
to bring suit against them for the required judicial filiation
order. Illegitimate children will refrain from such adversary proceedings for fear of "provoking disharmony by
suing their fathers. For the same reasons, mothers of
such illegitimates are unlikely to bring proceedings
against the father." 99 S.Ct. at 530. Lastly, "fathers who
do not even bother to make out wills. . .are unlikely to
take the time to bring formal filiation proceedings." Id.
Concomitantly, Justice Brennan noted that there were
less drastic means available for assuring accurate and
efficient distribution of intestate property without eliminating many deserving claims to heirship such as publication notice or a short statute of limitation within which
claims could be filed. Id.
The Court did not rule on that part of §4-1.2 requiring
the paternity proceeding to be brought "during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years of the birth of the
child." 4 It remains to be seen whether that part of the statute can muster 14th amendment approval.

See note I supra. Maryland law regarding illegitimate children inheriting from their fathers is as follows:
A child born to parents who have not participated in a marriage ceremony with each other shall be considered to be the
child of his father only if the father (1) Has been judicially determined to be the father in an action brought under the statutes
relating to paternity proceedings; or (2) Has acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father, or (3) Has openly and notoriously recognized the child to be his child; or (4) Has
subsequently married the mother and has acknowledged, orally
or in writing, to be the father. MD. EST. & TRUST CODE ANN. §1
208(b) (1974).

The New-Fangled Warrant
by Mark Henckel
Although the Supreme Court had applied the Fourth
Amendment to state administrative searchesi involving
municipal fire, health and housing inspection programs,
the Court's position as to the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to federal administrative codes and procedures was unclear. The Supreme Court settled that
question in Marshall u. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307
(1978).
In Marshall, an inspector from the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration attempted to inspect
an electrical and plumbing installation business without a
search warrant pursuant to federal statute.2 The owner
refused to permit any search of the warehouse without a
warrant. The inspector was limited to the public area of
the premises. An injunction was obtained against the
search, and the Secretary of Labor appealed.
On appeal, the Surpreme Court, in a 5-3 decision, applied Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) and held
that the Fourth Amendment mandated a warrant for
OSHA inspections. Justice White, speaking for the
majority, began by stating that the "Warrant clause of
the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings
as well as private homes." 436 U.S. at 311. After reaffirming the holdings in Camara and See, Justice White
turned to the government's position that an exception
from the search warrant requirement had been recognized for "pervasively regulated business[es]," United
States u. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972), and for
"closely regulated" industries "long subject to close
supervision and inspection." Colannade CateringCorp.
u. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 74, 77 (1970). The majority
quickly distinguished these cases due to the types of
industry involved (firearms and liquor, respectively). The
Court stated that when an "entrepreneur embarks upon
such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject
himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation.. .The
clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated
industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell is
the exception." 436 U.S. at 313. Nor did the mere fact
that businesses in interstate commerce are closely regu-

2

Camara u. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
The statute authorized the Secretary of Labor to empower agents
to enter and at reasonable times any "environment where work is
performed by an employee of an employer"; it further permitted
the agent to "inspect and investigate during regular working hours
and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in
a reasonable manner. .. all pertinent conditions, structures,
machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials.. and to
question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent, or
employee." 29 U.S.C. §657 (a) (1970).
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lated exempt them from the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.
The government then argued that the searches permitted under the statute were reasonable and necessary
to the enforcement of the statute, since to obtain a
search warrant would sacrifice the advantages of surprise. The Court, however, was not convinced that
"requiring warrants to inspect will impose serious
burdens on the inspection system or the courts, will prevent inspections necessary to enforce the statute, or will
make them less effective." Id. at 316. The Secretary
weakened his position by promulgating a regulation
which contemplated the use of a search warrant when
admission had been refused. 29 CFR §1903.43 Justice
White stated that if a warrant "endangers the efficient
administration of OSHA, the Secretary should never
have adopted it, particularly when the Act does not
require it." Id. at 319.
Turning to the issue of probable cause, the majority
held that for the purposes of an administrative search,
probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may
be based "not only on specific evidence of an existing violation, but also on a showing that 'reasonable legislative
or administrative standards for conducting an.. inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].' Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 538." Id.
320-321. In closing, the Court limited its holding to the
OSHA statute saying that the "reasonableness of a warrantless search would depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute." Id.
at 321.
Mr. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackman and
Rehnquist, based his dissent on two premises: (1) that
the inspection contemplated by the statute fell outside
the command of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) that the
warrant could be issued on grounds that constituted less
than the traditional measure of probable cause.
3

The regulation provided that all refusals of requests for voluntary

admissions be reported to the agent's superior, who shall
"promptly take appropriate action, including compulsory pro-

cess, if necessary." 29 CFR §1903.4.
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Justice Stevens looked first to the probable cause
argument. He believed that the searches involved need
only be analyzed under the reasonableness clause of the
Fourth Amendment. 436 U.S. at 327. The dissenters
claimed the application of the warrant clause was
unfaithful to the balance struck by the framers of the
Fourth Amendment-the requirement of probable
cause to prevent the issuance of general search warrants. Justice Stevens pointed out, however, that a warrantless search is to be governed and controlled through
the use of the reasonableness clause. Such searches
would be valid because they conform to the measurements of the reasonableness clause.
Justice Stevens and his fellow dissenters then applied
a balancing test to determine whether a warrant is a
necessary safeguard in a given class of cases. In the test
the Court "weighed the public interest against the
Fourth Amendment interest of the individual. . ." Id. at
329. The minority felt that the balance should be struck
in favor of the routine inspection due to policy consideration. The dissenters looked to the fact that Congress had
determined that regulation and supervision of safety in
the work place furtheted an important public interest
and that "the power to conduct warrantless searches is
necessary to accomplish the safety goals of the legislation." Id. Yet, in light of Camara and See, the dissenters
could not point out any statistics or studies which
showed that enforcement of city and state health and
safety regulation were hindered by a warrant requirement. Mr. Justice Stevens also pointed to an impending
increase in "the rate at which employers deny entry to
inspectors. . .," 436 U.S. at 329, but again he failed to
point out any statistics that support his claim over the ten
years since Camara and See were decided.
The dissenters also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of 29 CFR, §1903.4.4 The statute, according to
the Justice, was "promulgated against the background of
a statutory right of immediate entry." 436 U.S. at 330.
The resort to process was to be a step used to obtain
entry in the "occasional denial of entry" cases.
But Justice Stevens failed to realize that surprise is
not lost to the inspector when a warrant is obtained even
in the "occasional case of denial entry." A warrant is
obtained in an ex parte proceeding and no notice needs
to be given to the subject of the warrant. Where entry
was denied, the warrant may be obtained and the agent
may reappear at the premises without further notice to
the establishment being inspected. By creating 29 CFR
§1903.4, the Secretary acknowledged that even if surprise is needed, it is not destroyed by an ex parte warrant.
Finally, the minority turned to the three functions a
warrant would serve: (1) to inform the employer that the
4

See note 3 supra.
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inspection was authorized by statute; (2) to advise him of
the lawful limits of the inspection; and (3) to assure him
that the person demanding entry is an authorized inspector. The dissenters felt that these functions added little to
the protection already afforded by statute. In fact, they
concluded that the warrant was "essentially a formality."
436 U.S. at 334. The dissenters accepted the Secretary's
argument that a business, by its special nature and voluntary existence, may open itself to intrusions that would
not be permissible in a purely private contract. Justice
Stevens would apply this rationale to any business
regardless of the nature of its business. Yet it would
make a mockery of the Fourth Amendment to limit its
application, in the administrative law contest, to only private residences. Such a reading would pave the way to a
challenge by business establishments on equal protection grounds under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
clause. The majority avoids such a confrontation by universally applying the Fourth Amendment to administrative searches of residences as well as businesses.

Fair Representation vs.
Systematic Exclusion
by J. Michael Earp
The Supreme Court in Duran u.Missouri, 99 S.Ct. 664
(1979) overturned a Missouri defendant's first degree
murder conviction in holding that a "systematic exclusion of women [which] results in jury venires averaging
less than 15% females violates the Constitution's faircross-section requirement." 99 S.Ct. at 666. The decision, delivered by Justice White, represents a further
progression in the Whitus to Castendal line of cases
establishing and defining the meaning of a fair trial under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In Taylor v. Louisiana 419 U.S. 522 (1975) the Supreme Court had ruled that a jury selection system
which automatically excluded all women unless they
chose to register for jury service violated a defendant's
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights-in that "petit
juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative
of the community." 419 U.S. at 538. The Missouri statute 2 here involved, however, did not, ab initio, automatically exclude women from the jury selection process but
I Castaneda v. Partida,430 U.S. 482 (1977); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975); Alexander u. Louisiana,405 U.S. 625 (1972);
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Duncan u. Louisiana,391

U.S. 145 (1968); and Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967), all

dealt with the jury selection process, although none are precisely
analogous.
2 Missouri Revised Statutes §494.031(2) (Supp. 1978). See also Mis
souri Const. Art. 1, §22(b).

rather provided them with blanket exemptions, if they
chose to exercise their exemption privilege.
The present case arose when petitioner Duren's convictions for first degree murder and first degree robbery
were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri after
the lower court had denied both a pretrial motion to
quash his petit jury panel and a post-conviction motion
for a new trial. Duren claimed that his right to trial by a
jury chosen from a fair-cross-section of his community
was denied because of the Missouri statute granting
women an automatic exemption from jury service upon
their mere request to be exempt. The statute provided
for either disqualification or exemption from jury service
for several listed occupations and other categories, including men over 65 and women. A further exemption
for women resulted in practice, because a prospective
woman juror was allowed to claim her exemption at any
time prior to being sworn in as a juror and was treated as
having claimed the exemption if she failed to appear for
jury service on the day for which she was summoned.
Other prospective jurors were required either to make
written or personal application to the court for an exemption or be subject to contempt of court sanctions if
they did not appear for jury service. The effect of the statute, established by statistical evidence undisputed at the
trial level, was that when Duren's trial began only 15.5%
of those on the weekly venires were women.
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions, holding that the number of females summoned and appearing in the jury selection process were
well above acceptable constitutional limitations. State v.
Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11 (1977). The state court questioned
the adequacy of the statistical evidence presented by the
petitioner and found that the petitioner had failed to
show unequivocally that the low percentage of women
appearing for jury service was the result of the automatic
exemption for women and not some other cause.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Missouri Supreme Court, based its decision on Taylor which held, as
stated previously, that "petit jurors must be drawn from
a source fairly representative of the community." 419
U.S. at 538. To establish a prima facie violation of the faircross-section requirement, the Court held that three
standards must be demonstrated by the person challenging the selection process:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the
number of such persons in the community; and (3)
that this representation is due to systematic exclusion
of the group in the jury selection process.
99 S.Ct. at 668. The Court, in the present case, found
that the petitioner had successfully met his burden for
each of the three standards.

